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 Does a state leader’s psychology influence lethality in civil wars? This thesis analyzes the 
aforementioned question during post-1945 civil wars. This particular subject, paying close 
attention to individual psychology at the state level, is gaining traction amongst scholars, though 
limited scholarly attention has addressed whether leader psychology is an indicator of conflict 
severity in terms of lethality. The psychology of the state leader in this thesis is assessed from 
leadership traits and operational code indices, specifically direction of strategy (I1) and 
interpretation of the nature of the political universe (P1). The data and cases used are pulled from 
datasets by Dr. James Fearon and the Correlates of War Project. The leaders’ speech content is 
derived primarily from prepared material and analyzed using verbal content analysis via Profiler 
Plus. In measuring the effects of the predictors on my dependent variable, I chose the 
methodological approach of count data models, specifically, zero-truncated negative binomial 
regression. The results from the eight models I ran show that specific psychological traits, 
particularly a leader’s I1 and P1 scores, level of distrust, and need for power, do play a 
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 The substantive research question investigated in this paper is whether a state leader’s 
psychological orientation has an effect on conflict lethality, measured by the number of non-state 
battle deaths during a civil war. For the purposes of this paper, a civil war is defined here as 
“armed conflict within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to 
a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas, 2006, 5). 
Interpretations and definitions for civil war, however, can be numerous, varied, and, as 
Kalyvas (2006, 366) describes it, can feel “like unwrapping Russian dolls: one layer of 
interpretation yields to another in an endless and irresolvable quest for a ‘real’ nature that 
presumably lies hidden underneath.” I have chosen to look exclusively at civil wars as a result of 
my interest in this type of warfare and the reality of the shifting paradigm of war since 1945, 
away from conventional and interstate and towards asymmetric and intrastate, as well as the 
future implications of and trends in warfighting. 
 Much research has focused on civil war onset, duration, and termination, but little has 
been done regarding civil war lethality. Even less scholarly attention has been spent on leader 
behavior during civil wars. Accounting for civil war determinants of lethality by examining the 
state without the decision-making element misses a very important facet of the conflict process 
responsible for violence. 
My research question focuses on the conscious and subconscious personality 
characteristics of state leaders engaged in civil wars that have occurred since 1945. From this 





a civil war is significantly enhanced by a leader’s psychology. How a state leader perceives the 
political universe and his beliefs on how to achieve political goals, along with certain leadership 
traits inherent to personality, is an essential aspect of research pertaining to leader behavior. 
Violence initiated by state leaders should not be overlooked at a period in time when 
conventional wars are increasingly becoming uncommon, as internal and asymmetric wars, 
encompassing a changing dynamic in warfighting, become more prevalent. 
The practical significance of studying post-World War II (WWII) civil wars is based on 
the changing dynamic of warfare since 1945. The development and employment of “weapons 
have always helped determine tactics, tactics in turn helped determine organization, operations, 
strategy, logistics, and command and control systems. All these were driven by the technology in 
use and, in turn, drove it along” (Creveld, 2007, 1). Massive deployments of light and 
mechanized armies have been employed in fewer conflicts since WWII due to the evolving 
nature of the battlefield and warfare tactics. 
Warfare drastically changed after WWII. A shift toward limited warfare fought on a more 
local level began encompassing a military strategy reliant on the strategic balance gained from 
the limited scope of military action and increased popular support. This became the determining 
factor for victory (Nowlin & Stupak, 1998; Kahn, 1960; Russett, 1963).  
The advancements in weaponry, tactics, and technology fostered by the Second World 
War have resulted in what Roger Trinquier (1964) calls the modern age of warfare. I expound on 
Trinquier’s definition and define modern warfare as a subversive and unconventional form of 
warfare involving political, economic, military, and psychological tactics in order to gain the 





and legitimate government. Further, it can be said that unconventional warfare “occurs if and 
when the adversaries confronting each other have grossly disproportionate capabilities, whether 
in manpower, resources, or organizational base” (Janos, 1963, 637) and is heavily reliant on 
popular support. In this way, modern warfare has not only affected the strategies and tactics of 
wars since WWII as evident by the diminishing roles of tanks, large troop formations, and 







 Academics and military professionals have produced comparable work pertaining to the 
distinct aspect and dynamic of warfare. The broad spectrum of civil war literature covers many 
facets and seeks to answer how and why civil wars start, how they are fought, why they last so 
long, how they are terminated, or why they are so violent. Very little literature, however, has 
sought to isolate state leader personalities when attempting to discover the determinants of 
lethality. I intend to explore this further by theorizing that state leader psychology, when 
controlling for structural determinants, impacts the lethality of a civil war. While most of the 
literature aims to analyze the structural variables associated with the causes of violence in civil 
war (Fearon, 2003; & Fearon and Laitin, 1999; Janos, 1963; Kalyvas, 2006; Lacina, 2006), I aim 
to expound upon what little literature exists regarding the human factor and psychology to 
further explain lethality. In some cases I use existing data and datasets that are largely congruent 
with my own to explain the causal mechanisms for violence. 
The Nature of Civil Warfare 
 A considerable amount of literature exists that discusses the nature of civil wars. 
Strategists like Sun-Tzu (1971), Mao Tse-tung (1966), and Karl von Clausewitz (1942 & 1965) 
examine tactics and warfare from opposing sides as warfighters themselves. While their critiques 
can be applied to the entire breadth of war, Sun-Tzu and Mao, in particular, discuss warfare from 





state and though his assertions are concentrated on conventional warfare, his references are no 
less applicable to the asymmetric nature of civil war. 
 Each author maintains the importance of resources and popular support in war in order to 
obtain victory. Two of Clausewitz’s general principles of warfare are the possession of material 
and other sources of strength and gaining positive public opinion (Clausewitz, 1942). These 
guiding principles of warfare, though intended for conventional warfighting methods, can be 
translated rather effectively for civil wars. Arreguín-Toft (2005) adds to these notions by stating 
that weak actors win wars against strong actors because of the interaction of the strategies they 
use more so than their relative power. 
Civil war is itself an instrument of politics, fought by revolutionary or insurgent forces in 
protracted conflict utilizing guerrilla tactics in difficult terrain until the insurgent forces are 
strong enough to fight a conventional war against the state in order to change or overthrow the 
current political structure (Payne, 1989). Scholars have maintained several causes for the onset 
and duration of civil war. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that grievances are largely the causal 
mechanism associated with the onset of civil war. It can be further said that those excluded from 
the winning coalition become frustrated with the state for allocating and redistributing resources 
to the benefit of the state instead of the disenfranchised populace (Bueno de Mesquita, et al, 
2005). Other scholars, such as Collier and Hoeffler (1998) maintain that power and economic 
conditions of the state influence onset. Still another school of thought maintained by some 
scholars such as Reynal-Querol (2002), says that social and ethno-religious concerns are the 
likely cause of most civil wars. While studying civil war onset is not the objective of this thesis, 





lethality. Kalyvas (2006) says that although the above conditions may be present at the onset of 
civil war, the breakdown or dissolution of the monopoly of violence by way of armed conflict 
within the boundaries of a state is a better explanation for civil war onset and an important factor 
when studying civil war lethality and violence. 
 Civil wars occur in different forms with different warfighting styles. Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), among others such as, the participants in the Correlates of War Project, Sambanis (2003), 
Doyle and Sambanis (2006), and Small and Singer (1982) classify civil wars as having three 
basic criteria. According to them, the conflict must first meet the definition of civil war, which is 
“fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, non-state groups who sought 
either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change 
government policies” (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, 76). The second and third criteria state that at least 
1000 individuals must be killed with a yearly average of 100 individuals killed in addition to at 
least 100 individuals killed on both sides (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, 76). Small and Singer (1982) 
define a civil war as having aggressive military action within a metropole with resistance to the 
state by a non-actor and meeting a 1000 death threshold.  
Naturally, difficulties arise when classifying civil wars based on deaths (Sambanis, 
2004). This is accounted for because “the 1,000 cumulative-death criterion divided by the 100 
deaths-per-year rule gives a 10-year window for minor conflicts to be labeled civil wars” 
(Sambanis, 2004, 824). This paper uses the same criteria and 1000 death threshold, as stipulated 
by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Sambanis (2004), to indicate a civil war, distinguish them from 
other forms of violent conflict, such as coups, terrorist attacks, and ethnic or tribal skirmishes 





 Bueno de Mesquita, et al (2005) discuss revolutions as a form of civil war and use 
selectorate theory to suggest that insurgent or revolutionary motivations are grounded with the 
intention of overthrowing the political system in order to include the excluded selectorate in the 
winning coalition. Selectorate theory links the winning coalition with the selectorate regarding 
the distribution of resources and how those decisions are related to the political survival of state 
leaders (Bueno de Mesquita, et al, 2005). Given this assessment of political logic in civil war, 
one can attest to how civil wars are fought from the perspective of the state. This perspective will 
change given the political dynamics of differing regime types but in the end, decisions made 
during civil war will be representative of a leader’s desire to maintain power (Gartzke, 2001; 
Downes, 2008).  
Civil War Lethality 
Though violence itself might be seen as an unacceptable consequence of war, particularly 
when the violence is lopsided, violence against those fighting the conflict might be seen as 
inevitable and necessary (Hinde & Watson, 1995). Snyder and Jervis (1999) and Kalyvas (2006) 
observe that the relationship between the state and non-state actors on the precipice of a civil war 
breaks down as a result of a security dilemma and that civil wars are more violent than interstate 
wars because individuals are more vulnerable than states. A security dilemma refers to any 
situation in which one actor attempting to increase its security subsequently drives the opposing 
actor to increase its own security in response, thus reducing the security of both sides (Snyder 





Man would be in a constant state of war without government (Hobbes, 1651). This idea 
from Leviathan also helps to explain the contentiousness that arises between states experiencing 
internal conflict. The breakdown of government or the rise of factions challenging the legitimacy 
or power of government forces the country into a violent rift. 
Violence refers to “the deliberate infliction of harm on people” (Kalyvas, 2006, 19). 
Violence is not limited solely to the battlefield but can manifest itself, either in indiscriminate
1
 or 
selective forms, from both the insurgent and incumbent against those not directly involved in the 
conflict. Violence is a strategy, used to exterminate or control a group or population as well as to 
deter or coerce them. Furthermore, Walter (2009) argues that leaders do not fight over territory 
alone but because violence helps the state deter insurgents from pursuing secession in the future. 
Violence in civil war is often endogenous to the causes of civil war onset and once it 
begins it causes and sustains more violence (Friedrich, 1972; Poole, 1995). Clausewitz (1873) 
viewed temperance in war as absurd; victory, to him, is the overarching objective of any 
campaign by overwhelming and decimating the enemy through superior force. How the state 
inflicts violence is yet another avenue for discussion on the increased lethality of civil wars since 
WWII.  
As technology has advanced, so have the strategies of warfare. State leaders (as well as 
insurgents and terrorists) now have the ability to kill the enemy from a distance, limiting the 
emotional impact of the fight on the soldier. By detaching the human effect from combat, a state 
                                                 
1
 Indiscriminate violence in civil war is often a result of individual motivation, based solely on the target group’s 





leader is able to give a command from a safe distance to send troops into battle, unleash a 
barrage of artillery fire, or call for an aerial bombardment (Tromp, 1995). 
The severity of a civil war, in terms of battle related deaths, is related to opportunity and 
motivation, though scholars often take one side or another. As both sides of a conflict gain 
momentum and strength, and as the war prolongs, both sides are apt to focus more on military 
action rather than diplomacy as the only solution for victory (Lacina, 2006). Mills (1956), in 
referencing the decline of diplomacy and the rise of the military-political elite during the Cold 
War, stated that diplomacy cannot exist, and, in fact, becomes meaningless when negotiations 
are seen as appeasement and not agreement. This, in turn, results in the outbreak or continuation 
of war and violence as the only necessary mechanisms to serve the ensuing animosity. The 
military-political elite are likely to use coercive force and instrumental violence when there is 
instability within a country caused by social change and an internal threat to the state’s power 
(Horowitz, 1972; Huntington, 1968; and Eisenstadt, 1966). Violence and hostilities can help 
maintain the status quo, preexisting boundaries, and internal cohesion. Instilling fear and the 
subsequent hope of forestalling future violence as a result of sedition in a population also helps 
perpetuate an allegiance to a state leader (Coser, 1957; Simmel, 1955; Wright, 1942a; & Wright, 
1942b). 
Scholars have also found that civil wars in which a government is a superior force to the 
enemy is more likely to incorporate higher levels of violence against their weaker opponents as 
well as noncombatants (Arreguín-Toft, 2003). Further, governments that face a strong 
insurgency with widespread popular support are also likely to incorporate increased levels of 





important when understanding why democratic counterinsurgencies result in lower levels of 
violence as opposed to nondemocratic counterinsurgencies. Engelhardt (1992) notes that most 
democratic successes in counterinsurgency warfare are a result of fighting weak enemies and 
little need to use harsh tactics and strategies.  
From another perspective, contrary to Mao, Hobbes, Kalyvas, and other scholars who 
argue that the monopolization of violence is an extension of power, the monopolization of 
violence can also be argued to exist wherever a power vacuum exists. When the state struggles to 
maintain its legitimacy and control by a lack or absence of power, violence becomes a tool of the 
weak state (Arendt, 1970; May, 2001). Through social conflict, a weakened power structure in 
the state, and the rise of insurgent groups, the orchestration of violence becomes a desperate 
strategy on the part of the state to maintain power and the status quo.  
Psychology and State Leaders during Civil War 
Psychological variables and the human context must be considered alongside situational 
assessments when discussing behavior and decision-making in civil war. Though most of the 
political science literature applies leader personality and psychology to international affairs, the 
same literature can also explain the causal mechanisms for civil wars and violence by treating 
non-state actors in a civil war as one would treat actors in a dyadic war. Greenstein (1969) 
suggests that there exists four conditions when a leader’s personality is more likely to have an 
impact on warfighting strategy: when the leader controls or occupies a strategic location, when 





particular scenario, and when the leader must make quick, spontaneous decisions. Levy (2003) 
explains that a leader’s psychological variables interact with other causal and structural variables 
in order to help explain the leader’s beliefs, decisions, and actions regarding policy. He goes on 
to add that the impact of psychological variables on foreign policy analysis is in explaining 
outcomes and any variant in said outcomes, not just explaining “links between the links” (Levy, 
2003, 255). 
 There also exists in leaders a motivational bias, based on individual psychological needs 
like fears and desires, and a cognitive bias, where an individual’s prior beliefs affect their 
observation and interpretation of information. Levy (2003) argues that these biases may lead to 
irrational decision-making or a tactical change in the leader’s beliefs about how to best achieve a 
particular end. This is particularly the case in protracted civil conflict where the conflict becomes 
a part of daily life and affects such facets of society as economic, psychological, cultural, and 
social-structural dimensions that shape the political environment and place political constraints 
upon the government (Kelman & Fisher, 2003). Furthermore, as Levy (2003) states, the 
fundamental attribution error
2
 relates to miscalculations about the others’ undesirable behavior 
based on a leader’s predisposition to interpret these behaviors based on his internal factors rather 
than environmental or structural constraints. 
 Kelman & Fisher (2003, 321) highlight the collective fears and needs of actors engaged 
in conflict that lead to “perceptual and cognitive constraints on their processing of new 
                                                 
2
 The fundamental attribution error is the attempt to explain an individual’s behavior in any given situation by 
inferring that the causal mechanisms of the behavior pertain to internal, or personality, characteristics rather than 





information, with a resulting tendency to underestimate the occurrence of change” thus making 
conflict resolution that much harder to achieve. These misperceptions or perceptual constraints 
relating to the other often result in “expressions of hostility and distrust toward the enemy as 
normatively prescribed behaviors…marked by delegitimization and dehumanization…[that] 
contributes to escalation and perpetuation of the conflict” (Kelman & Fisher, 2003, 321). 
 Staub and Bar-Tal (2003) list several psychological and societal processes along with 
certain cultural characteristics which contribute to the escalation of violence in civil war. Among 
these attributes that play a role in the occurrence of violence in civil conflict are ideological and 
societal beliefs and nondemocratic societies. These psychological and structural attributes help 
further explain the causation for increasing lethality in civil war by the state.
3
 
                                                 
3
 Several pieces of literature also show the impact of psychology in leader decision making during times of 
war. Lorenz (1995) and Rapoport (1995) look specifically towards aggression and the fundamental causes of 
aggression in assessing the prevalence of violence in intrastate wars. The behavioral versus social contrast when 
discussing psychology and violence deals with more complex issues than just aggression (Hinde & Watson, 1995). 
There are two basic personality theory approaches to violence: frustration-aggression and rational-choice. 
Frustration-aggression approaches, attributed to personality theory, see actions and violence as an irrational response 
to negative stimuli, such as stress or failure. Rational-choice approaches assume that all behaviors are purpose 
driven and goal-oriented while considering the cost-benefit ratio of one’s actions (Felson, 2004, 71). 
The establishment of social classes in the division of labor also may eventually lead to exploitation and 
strife and the disintegration into an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality (Rapoport, 1995). Social learning theory has 
suggested that personality is shaped by cultural and social experiences and that where a person falls on a 
compulsion-compassion scale is a determinant of the identity of the individual as well as the activity types in which 
the individual is likely to engage (Rapoport, 1995). Regarding the role of the nurturing or environmental effects on 
behavior, “violent behavior and the readiness to commit acts of violence is acquired, enacted, and changed through 
variations in association, stimuli, and other variable in the social learning process” and can manifest itself from 
societal or group influence or even more deliberate means such as training, education, and indoctrination (Akers & 
Silverman, 2004, 24). 
Prospect theory is another avenue that examines the situational context of behavior and decision-making. It 
differs from personality theory in that the leader will consider possible outcomes and incur higher levels of risk 





Hinde &Watson (1995) suggest that violence is committed in modern warfare because 
there is rarely an individualistic attribute
4
 to combat. Soldiers can effectively destroy the enemy 
from a distance while state leaders are cordoned and protected from violence. This culture of 
technology and advanced weaponry has desensitized the human mind to accept killing another 
human when there is no direct, psychological connection between the two enemies. It is the 
leader’s belief system that influences a leader’s decision to order his troops to commit acts of 
violence. 
To identify likely patterns of leader behavior and to determine a state leader’s specific 
belief system (instrumental and philosophical), George (1969) asked a total of ten questions in 
order to assess a leader’s operational code. Operational code analysis is “an approach to the 
study of political leaders that may focus narrowly on a set of political beliefs or more broadly on 
a set of beliefs embedded in the personality of a leader or originating from the cultural matrix of 
a society” (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003, 216). The philosophical beliefs are designed to 
measure how a leader views other actors within the political universe or how a leader might see 
the context of a particular action, while instrumental beliefs measure how a leader’s own 
preferences within the political universe in terms of goals and risks and the most effective means 
in achieving those goals (Winter, 2003; George, 1969). The value for the nature of the political 
universe (P-1) falls between -1.0 (extremely hostile) and 1.0 (extremely friendly) and the value 
                                                 
4
 Here, an individualistic attribute concerns the personal familiarity with the enemy and killing typically denoted by 





for strategic direction (I-1) also falls between -1.0 (extremely conflictual) and 1.0 (extremely 
cooperative) (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003, 226). 
Current operational code research uses a system within Profiler Plus, but separate from 
leadership trait analysis, that analyzes the content of a leader’s speeches and writings, known as 
the Verbs in Context System (VICS) (Schafer & Walker, 2001; Walker, Schafer, & Young, 
2003). This system analyzes a leader’s operational code from public sources and statements 
made by the leader, most notably, public speeches (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003). It 
analyzes these public sources and retrieves belief patterns and, subsequently, interprets from 
them certain behavioral attributes compatible with said beliefs by extracting “values for six 
attributes for each recording unit (verb) and its surrounding context: subject, verb category, 
domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended target, and context” (Walker, Schafer, & Young 
1998, 1999; Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003). Winter (2003) warns against relying too heavily 
on simple attributions of political outcomes to a leader’s personality and neglecting the structural 
constraints and actions of other actors, though he continues to note that both personality and 
situational factors must be considered when analyzing leader behavior and decision-making in 
war. 
An examination of personality types can be categorized in four ways, by trait, motive, 
cognition, and social context. Within each of these categories can be found leadership traits that 





helps us understand how leaders relate to those around them. I examine four leadership traits
5
 for 
this particular study: the general distrust or suspiciousness of others, self-confidence, conceptual 
complexity, and the need for power and influence (Taysi & Preston, 2001; Hermann, 2003). The 
Personality Assessment-at-a-Distance (PAD) technique is used to analyze the verbal content of 
the political leaders in order to find values for each of the traits (Taysi & Preston, 2001; 
Hermann, 2003).  
This technique consists of collecting data from either prepared material such as speeches 
and letters or spontaneous material such as interviews. As I discussed above, I use prepared 
material for my study as the primary means of collection. Though, in certain cases, as I denote in 
the data, I have gathered and utilized spontaneous verbal material from interviews in order to 
meet my requisite threshold of four thousand words. This psychological analysis of leaders in 
war should add to the limited scholarship available that explains what effects or costs certain 
intrinsic, psychological determinants have on civil war lethality. 
  
                                                 
5
 Hermann (2003) lists seven leadership traits in total. I use as variables only the four I present in the paper. The 
remaining three: in-group bias, task orientation, and the belief in one’s own ability to control events were omitted 
because these leadership traits, while important in assessing leader personality, are not the best reflections of how a 






 My sample of cases comes from a combination of Fearon’s (2003) list of civil wars in the 
post-WWII era and from the Correlates of War Project. The unit of analysis I study is states in 
those civil wars. The dataset comes from the total number of civil wars having occurred since 
1945 minus those cases either missing dependent variable data or where content data from the 
leaders is either lacking the requisite four thousand words or nonexistent in the English language. 
These parameters leave me with thirty cases. As the data that can be seen in Appendix B attest, 
those cases that were dropped for not meeting the requisite requirements for inclusion were 
dispersed across the entire distribution of battle deaths. I have also elected not to include those 
civil wars with multiple successive state leaders where there was not one leader in power for 
more than fifty percent of the conflict duration in order to avoid potential errors related to the 
effects that different leaders potentially have on warfighting. I use a dummy variable to control 
for those leaders whose tenure in office began after civil war onset and lasted more than fifty 
percent of the civil war. 
 I used STATA to analyze my count data by running zero-truncated negative binomial 
regression models with cross-sectional data from post-WWII civil wars in order to quantify the 
effects of a leader’s psychology on the dependent variable, lethality.
6
 The reasons for using count 
data models, specifically negative binomial regression, come as a result of my dependent 
                                                 
6
 There is disagreement as to which method is preferable with regard to the specifics of my dependent variable, most 
notably, the high values attributed to non-state battle deaths. As Hilbe (2008, 5) suggests, “Usually when modeling 
counts, the number of counts is between 8 and 40. When there are a large number of counts, it may be preferable to 
model as if it were continuous.” Though he also admits that count data modeling can in fact be used despite the 





variable constituting count data, which is discrete and not continuous, and “generally understood 
[to be] non-negative integers” (Hilbe, 2008, 5) and because my data does not allow for any 
partial integers.  
Further, my models were adjusted to account for the lack of zeroes in my dependent 
variable (Hilbe, 2011, 36). Because of this and regardless of the large number of observations of 
non-state battle deaths per case, count data models are a better way to explain the dependent 
variable. Looking at my models, the likelihood-ratio tests of alpha are zero, suggesting that a 
negative binomial regression model is better suited to explain my data than a Poisson regression 
model due to overdispersion of the dependent variable. Furthermore, without the possibility of 
zeroes for my dependent variable data, a zero-truncated negative binomial regression model was 
used after being deemed most appropriate (Hilbe, 2011; Long, 1997). Horowitz, Simpson, & 
Stam (2011) also use a similar approach in the usage of count data models for analyzing large 
numbers of military casualties with discrete, non-zero data. While count data is often analyzed 
with ordinary least squares. Long (1997, 217) warns that “use of the linear regression models for 
count outcomes can result in inefficient, inconsistent, and biased estimates.” Advice from other 




                                                 
 
7 Dr. David Bearce (Colorado), and Dr. Philip Pollack (UCF), and Dr. Andrea Vieux (UCF) provided their expert 
opinions on this matter. Further, addressing the other school of thought regarding which methodological or 
econometric approach to use when analyzing count values for a dependent variable, there exists support for linear 
regression models in circumstances similar to that which exist in my thesis. In this thesis, as I have stated 
previously, I have chosen count models as opposed to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), because it was the best way 
for me to see the relationship between the predictors and the dependent variable due to the discrete number of 





 The dependent variable I am studying in this thesis is lethality, which measures the 
aggregate, non-state (non-governmental) battle deaths inflicted by the state on its people during a 
civil war from its onset to its termination. The dependent variable is measured on an interval 
scale. To obtain the value for my dependent variable in terms of non-state battle deaths, I 
subtract total battle deaths of state participants from total (aggregate) battle deaths overall, found 
in the COW – Intrastate War dataset, to include noncombatants and insurgent forces. Battle 
deaths are defined as fatalities resulting solely from military operations (Lacina & Gleditsch, 
2005). I chose to look at deaths resulting from battle-related causes in order to isolate and 
explain the causal psychological variables of the leader in relation to violence, discarding deaths 
as a result of natural causes. It is also the most direct indicator of human costs of war (Downes, 
2008, 60).  
 Non-state battle deaths are studied in order to distinguish casualties directly resulting 
from conflict from other causes of death that are unrelated to the dependent variable such as 
violent crime, communicable diseases, starvation, and other non-battle related fatalities. 
However, disaggregating the noncombatants killed by the rebels and those killed by the state 
provided some levels of difficulty
8
 in separating one from the other. Lethality is a measurement 
that includes all enemy combatant deaths as well as noncombatant deaths because “it is difficult 
                                                                                                                                                             
count process, has high values, typically in the thousands, it is unnecessary to use count data models. While not 
necessary, arguably count data models can be used with smaller count values (Cameron & Trivedi, 1986; Cameron 
& Trivedi, 1998; Katchova, 2013; Quine & Seneta, 1986; University of Minnesota, 2010; Winkelmann & 
Zimmermann, 1995).  
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 Here, the author understands the impossible task of delineating which few civilian deaths were caused by the 
insurgents and which deaths were caused by the state in certain ambiguous situations. These deaths, for the purposes 





to distinguish between irregular forces and noncombatants” when pursuing a direct route to 
victory during civil war (Downes, 2008, 158). 
Verbal Analysis 
I use the program Profiler Plus to analyze verbal material from each state leader in order 
to obtain the values of the leadership traits and the operational code indices of the individuals. 
The data collected for the content analysis consists of no less than four thousand words to ensure 
the viability of the values obtained for each psychological variable to be analyzed. Though the 
debate continues today as to whether prepared verbal samples versus spontaneous remarks are 
best for analyzing leaders at a distance, I use primarily prepared samples for the purposes of this 
thesis with the addition of spontaneous samples in order to meet the requisite four thousand word 
threshold for content analysis.
9
 The content samples are drawn from any period of time occurring 
before the conflict. This ensures that no endogeneity exists in the data; that a leader’s 
psychology, being altered by the onset of war, does not affect the measurement of his 
psychology as it pertains to civil war lethality. 
There are a couple of reasons why I have chosen to primarily use prepared material over 
spontaneous material. First, prepared samples provide more verbal material, particularly for 
those leaders in earlier cases when spontaneous material might not be wholly available, 
particularly for non-English speaking leaders (Schafer, 2000). Second, prepared verbal material 
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offers insight into the state’s decision-making process and better represents the state’s official 
views (Schafer & Walker, 2006). Though speeches, for example, might be written by a person 
other than the state leader, the speech itself is still representative of the state leader’s views and 
beliefs. 
Psychological Variables 
 The operationalization of the psychological variables studied is derived from Hermann 
(2003) and Walker & Schafer (2003), experts in leadership trait analysis and operational code 
analysis, respectively. Below, I provide the necessary definitions and explanations of each of the 
psychological variables used and analyzed through Profiler Plus. I also examine certain 
operational code indices for each state leader on a scale “illustrating the range of values 
associated with each index [with] a particular score [being] anchored to an interpretation based 
on the distance between the score and the nearest descriptor” (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003, 
226-227). 
The operational code variables included in this analysis measure a leader’s instrumental 
and philosophical beliefs. Instrumental beliefs “are those that inform the leader’s own 
preferences for political actions in terms of strategies and tactics” while philosophical beliefs 
“are those held by the leader to assess the nature of the political universe and other actors” 
(Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003, 217). I look exclusively at one particular facet of a leader’s 
instrumental belief, measured by I1, which indicates how conflictual or cooperative a leader’s 





belief, represented by P1, which indicates whether the political universe is hostile or friendly to a 
leader. The operational code indices help measure a leader’s view of the world and how they 
approach international affairs; it is a way to look at the leader’s conscious view of the world and 
their perceived place/role in it.  
 A leader’s operational coding reflects particular facets of his psychology in which his 
instrumental beliefs suggest the best way to achieve political ends. His philosophical beliefs of 
the political universe influence and direct how he perceives the context for action (George, 
1969). An instrumental belief is the belief that informs the leader’s own preferences for political 
actions in terms of strategies and tactics, while a philosophical belief is the belief used by the 
leader to assess the nature of the political universe and other actors in relation to himself 
(George, 1969).   
While each type of belief contains five separate categories, I am only looking at the first 
categories of each, I1 and P1, as they are the most basic identifiers of instrumental and 
philosophical beliefs. These two beliefs represent, respectively, their strategic approach to goals 
on a scale of extremely conflictual to extremely cooperative, and how a leader views the nature 
of the political universe on a scale of extremely hostile to extremely friendly. Holsti (1977) 
believed that a leader’s philosophical beliefs, or how he perceived the political universe, 
influenced a leader’s instrumental beliefs and how the leader developed and implemented 
strategy. Thus, my expectations are as follow: 
Hypothesis 1: As the leader’s strategic direction (I1) becomes increasingly 





Hypothesis 2: As the leader’s view of the political universe (P2) becomes 
increasingly friendlier (P1), non-state battle deaths will decrease.  
 Using a different approach to measure leader personality, Margaret Hermann (2003) 
reveals leadership styles and leader psychology through leadership trait analysis by analyzing 
seven distinct traits. She has developed a series of trait indicators that assess the personalities of 
political leaders by examining what they say and how their words affect the perception they give 
to the public. Among the personality traits she identifies as key characteristics of leadership style 
are distrust, self-confidence, conceptual complexity, and need for power. They are being studied 
because they are subconscious and inherent to a leader’s personality and as hypothesized, should 
play a causal role in lethality. The scores for each of these variables fall within the range of 0 to 
1. 
 Distrust, a lack of sureness that creates wariness or feelings of uncertainty towards 
others, is a trait that marks a suspicious predisposition towards the actions of other people. A 
leader is more likely to increase non-state battle deaths if he is distrustful of the enemy or the 
population’s motives and actions. This suspicious predisposition towards others results in a high 
distrust score, while a low distrust score is a reflection of a leader’s willingness to rely on or 
engage others in policy-making. The leader puts his distrust into perspective by basing trust and 
distrust “on past experience with the people involved and on the nature of the current situation” 
(Hermann, 2003, 203). How a leader perceives the actions of others, particularly his opponent, 
can be an indication of how the leader will act in a given situation especially if he feels he needs 
to act mercilessly or preemptively to prevent an attack by the enemy or send a coercive message 





Hypothesis 3: As the leader’s level of distrust increases, non-state battle deaths 
will increase. 
 Self-confidence is the measure of one’s own feeling of self-importance and is an 
assessment of the leader’s “ability to cope adequately with objects or persons in the 
environment” (Hermann, 2003, 194). A higher self-confidence score is indicative of how 
confident a leader is when making decisions and does not need any positive feedback to enhance 
feelings of self-worth. A leader with low self-confidence, however, is likely to act more 
unpredictably while seeking acceptance for his actions. Low levels of self-confidence will lead a 
leader to believe that he may have no other option for any measure of success save for imposing 
more damage and death upon his opponent, while attempting to influence others’ perception of 
himself. This unpredictability comes as a result of the leader being unsure of how to act and so 
acts in a way he thinks he should, based on how he wants to be perceived by others. Thus, my 
expectation is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: As the leader’s self-confidence increases, non-state battle deaths 
will decrease. 
 How leaders differentiate situations and people, whether in black and white terms, or 
with shades of gray, is an indication of their conceptual complexity. Leaders who are high in 
conceptual complexity can ponder multiple stimuli and perspectives when assessing a situation. 
Leaders with high conceptual complexity scores are also more likely to be flexible in reacting to 
ideas and to be more open to and considerate of the uncertainties in war. This ability to 
differentiate the complexities of conflict will guide the leader in seeking alternatives to violence 





strategically. Leaders with low conceptual complexity favor their intuition or the first option 
presented to them and understand scenarios or situations in terms of right or wrong, black or 
white (Hermann, 2003). The importance of a leader’s conceptual complexity is paramount in 
assessing a leader’s personality regarding levels of lethality and civil war, and it will identify 
how leaders view the battlefield and wartime decision making either on the tactical or strategic 
level. Thus, my expectation is as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: As the leader’s conceptual complexity increases, non-state battle 
deaths will decrease. 
 The need for power is a desire for “establishing, maintaining, or restoring one’s 
power…[by] controlling, influencing, or impacting other persons or groups” and when the score 
is high, they are “generally daring and charming…[who] have little regard for those around them 
or for people in general” (Hermann, 2003, 190-91). There is also willingness by leaders to use 
others as a tool to obtain their goals and their superiority or control over others.  Additionally, 
when a leader’s need for power score is high, it indicates that the leader wants to establish 
control through manipulation and coercion in order to gain victory through whatever means are 
available. A leader who requires more power will inflict more damage and death in order to 
assume or resume control and influence over his opponent and the population. Conversely, when 
a leader’s need for power score is low, it indicates less of a desire to be in control and more of an 
inclination to share influence and credit (Hermann, 2003). Thus, my expectation is as follows: 







Psychological variables alone do not have enough explanatory power to determine 
lethality, so I have also included several structural variables to control for outside factors and 
influencers which might also affect a civil war’s lethality. Most of the variables’ definitions have 
been pulled from other scholars and researchers that I have further expounded upon to better 
explain their relative variance and causality in regards to the dependent variable. 
RegimeType is representative of a nation’s system of government. This nominal variable 
serves to differentiate governments in which the state leaders are responsible to a free and equal 
people through the democratic process from all other forms of government, to include autocracy, 
aristocracy, authoritarianism, monarchy, military rule, theocracy, etc. I use the Polity IV index of 
regime types for each country at the time of their civil war onset. This index has a range of 
scores from -10 to 10. Regimes that fall within the range of -10 – 5 are coded as nondemocratic 
and given a value of ‘0’. Countries that fall within the range of 6-10 are coded as democratic and 
given a value of ‘1’.  
Bethany Lacina (2006) points out the relative lack of any definitive role regime type 
plays in civil war onset but proceeds to discuss the relative importance the variable plays when 
discussing conflict severity. Identifying if a state is democratic or nondemocratic is important in 
determining lethality in civil wars as a result of regime type. Because a democratic leader must 
account for public opinion, as well as the divided power structure common to democracies, 
democratic leaders are more conscious of political pressures when fighting a civil war. These 
democratic leaders are inclined to minimize violence in order to retain their political office 





negotiating and granting insurgent concessions in order to avoid any political backlash by 
disrupting social norms. Thus, my expectation is as follows: 
Hypothesis 7: If a state engaged in civil war is non-democratic, then non-state 
battle deaths will increase. 
Duration is operationalized as the total duration of the civil war, measured on an interval 
scale by the number of months from onset to termination, in order to control for the logical 
increase in lethality that occur in prolonged civil wars. The data for civil war duration comes 
from the Correlates of War – Intrastate War (v4.1) dataset. I have converted the data from years 
to months because the dates are presented not in number of years fought but in the actual years in 
which the war began and ended in order to better examine the lengths of each civil war.
10
 Thus, 
my expectation is as follows: 
Hypothesis 8: Non-state battle deaths will be higher the longer a civil war’s 
duration is. 
MilitaryExpenditure is an interval variable depicting the absolute amount of the country’s 
budget allocated to the military and is a better predictor of number of non-state battle deaths than 
addressing this as a percentage of a country’s budget. Coding this variable as a percentage of a 
country’s budget would result in poorer countries with a higher percentage of their budgets 
allocated to the military still producing a less overall amount and is thus, an incorrect comparison 
which could yield misleading results. The data comes from the Correlates of War – National 
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Material Capabilities (v4.0) dataset, is measured in thousands of current year US whole dollars, 
and averaged by the number of years of the civil war. The purpose of the variable is to serve as a 
control for countries with stronger and more developed militaries as well as for advanced 
weaponry and technology that may be used against any non-state actors during the course of 
internal conflict. The technological modernization of armies, especially in developing countries, 
affords an avenue for internal terror as well as a means for coercion and deterrence while 
undergoing the turmoil of economic development (Cortese, 1976; Moore, 1965). 
It is logical that a military’s spending increases during times of conflict as opposed to 
times of peace. Countries with larger economic output allocated to defense and military spending 
are more likely to affect the lethality, strategy, and outcome of civil war. A state leader must 
increase spending on troops, equipment, weapons, munitions, food, and other resources 
necessary for warfighting, which results in the using of violence as a means of securing or 
protecting assets of increasing worth and that are necessary to support operations (Humphreys, 
2003). Those countries with a higher military expenditure have an increased ability of protecting 
these assets and resources by increasing lethality. Thus, my expectation is as follows: 
Hypothesis 9: The more absolute money a country spends on its military, the 
higher the non-state battle deaths will be during civil war. 
ReligiousDifference is coded as a nominal variable, where ‘0’ represents leaders having 
the same religious preference as the majority of the populace and ‘1’ represents those leaders 
whose religious preference differs from that of the majority. This variable is included to 
determine the effects on lethality by whether or not the state leader shares the same religious 





on religious fractionalization, I modify their data to show only whether the leader shares the 
same religious affiliation as the majority of the state’s population. This data was corroborated 
through research on each individual state and leader in power at the time of civil war onset. 
I study this variable separately from ethnicity as religion has a sharper fragmentation 
within and among society than ethnicity does (Reynal-Querol, 2002). Further, as Professor Asma 
Afsaruddin (2012), from the University of Notre Dame alludes, in her lecture on Diversity of the 
Middle East: Ethnicity, Communal Identity, and Authority, religion is the main identifier of 
ethnicity which, itself, is comprised of a multitude of other identifiers including origin and 
language, and can be difficult to code. I chose to focus specifically on religion because this 
particular identifier represents the disparity between leader and populace and the violence that 
results from religious fractionalization. 
Though ethnicity and nationalism are relative identifiers of groups of people, religion has 
stronger associative properties. While an individual can belong to or claim one or more 
ethnicities or nationalities, it is uncommon and rather difficult to associate and belong to more 
than one religion in most areas of the world, particularly where religious fractionalization is 
strongest. Thus, my expectation is as follows: 
Hypothesis 10: Leaders with a religious affiliation different from the majority of 
the populace will increase the levels of non-state battle deaths during civil wars. 
PopulationDensity is coded on an interval scale and is derived by dividing the average 
total population of a country during civil war by its area. Lichbach (1995) argues that as a 
country’s population density increases, so also does the concentration of dissidents in a given 





coordination among insurgents. A concentration of persons within a given area also increases the 
probability of that area being occupied and used by insurgents as a base of operations and 
popular support as well as the state’s inability to differentiate combatant from noncombatant. 
This makes the population density variable more useful than the general population size of a 
country which may be misleading. Population numbers, without regard to the geographic size of 
the country, do not account for the above points. The data for the population density variable 
comes from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section
11
 and is measured by the estimated 
population per square kilometer. 
The likelihood of a violent event taking place increases as the population density 
increases, thereby, increasing the likelihood of greater lethality (Hegre & Raleigh, 2005). The 
higher the density of a population in a given country, the higher the likelihood of increased non-
state battle deaths is as a result of violence perpetrated by the state. Population density is directly 
correlated with the type of warfare involved and the resulting level of violence. For example, in 
areas with a lower population density, feuding and raiding are the likely forms of warfare 
conducted during conflicts resulting in limited violence, whereas in areas with higher population 
density feuding will take a back seat to war parties (Divale, 1973). Thus, my expectation is as 
follows: 
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Hypothesis 11: Higher population density will result in higher levels of non-state 
battle deaths during civil war. 
StateBattleDeaths is a measure of the number of the state’s own battle deaths, and the 
data comes from the COW – Intrastate War (v4.1) dataset. A leader’s propensity for retaliation 
through discriminate or indiscriminate violence increases the more fatalities the enemy inflicts 
upon the state. The variable is coded on an interval scale for the total duration of the civil war 
and aims to control for the violence attributed to retribution for the death’s suffered by the state 
at the hands of the enemy. Thus, my expectation is as follows: 
Hypothesis 12: The more battle deaths suffered by the state, the more non-state 
battle deaths will be suffered during the civil war. 
NonInitiatingLeader is a dummy variable that codes whether a leader came in to power at 
any point after the onset of civil war. Leaders who were in power at the onset of the civil war are 
coded with a value of ‘0’ whereas leaders who came to power during the civil war but after onset 
are coded with a value of ‘1’. It is expected that leaders who come in to power at any point 
during a civil war would inflict less non-state battle deaths than those leaders who were in office 
at the onset of the conflict.  
There are several reasons why a dummy variable to control for when the leader took 
office is an important factor in ensuring data legitimacy with regard to increased lethality. 
Leaders may be more desiring of quickly eliminating or quelling the insurgent threat before it 
gets beyond their control and in doing so, are more willing to increase lethality to prevent the 
conflict from escalating and threatening a leader’s hold on power. Leaders might also use 





population into not supporting the insurgents through material aid, harboring, or more active 
means such as joining the insurgent army.  
Leaders who come to power during civil war, and remain in power for more than fifty 
percent of the duration, might see that violence used at onset had not been a reliable strategy in 
preventing popular sympathy for the insurgents and is thus not a proper tool. These leaders might 
also be anxious to end hostilities and so choose different tactics to end the war. Lastly, they may 
not share the same psychological characteristics as their predecessors and cannot be measured 
the same way with regards to civil war lethality. It is for this reason that I control for when a 
leader was in power. Thus, my expectation is as follows: 
Hypothesis 13: Leaders who come to power at any point after the onset of civil 
war, and remain in power for more than fifty percent of the conflict’s duration, 
will have a lesser impact on civil war lethality than leaders who were in power at 
the onset of civil war and remained in power for more than fifty percent of the 
civil war’s duration. 
 In determining the causal effects for violence in civil wars as a result of leader 
psychology, I ran eight models, each measuring a different combination of variables on leader 
psychology based on bivariate correlations. This was done in order to avoid running models 
containing highly correlated variables which might adversely affect their relationship with the 
dependent variable. The conditions I used for dropping variables as a result of correlation were if 
any variables were significantly correlated with another at the 0.05 level and containing a 
magnitude with an absolute value of 0.4 or greater, indicating a correlation between variables 





coefficients first followed by their standard errors. Four models measure I1 against self-
confidence and either conceptual complexity or need for power in combination with regime type 
(with self-confidence), duration, military expenditure, religious difference, population density 
(with need for power), state battle deaths, and whether a leader came to power after the onset of 
civil war. Two models are run with P1 and self-confidence with either conceptual complexity or 
need for power. All structural variables minus regime type and religious difference are included 
in both models. The last two models analyze just the leadership traits of distrust and self-
confidence with either conceptual complexity or need for power. Regime type and duration are 
the only structural variables not included in both of these models because of the correlation with 
DIS. Finally, each significant psychological variable will be presented with a table of its 
predicted values measured against its unit increase
12
 to give a clearer picture of the effects of 
leader psychology on lethality in civil wars, presented as non-state battle deaths. 
 After running several bivariate correlation models in SPSS against all the independent 
variables in my regression model, to determine if any multicollinearity exists between any of 
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Table 1: Bivariate Correlations 
    





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Based on the results of the bivariate correlations, I ran eight models in order to review the 
effects of each predictor, independent of one another, on the dependent variable. Overall, the 
causal effects that a leader’s psychological disposition has on lethality during civil war offer 
some surprising and significant results. Each case that was available for analysis as well as the 
specific verbal content used to achieve the requisite four thousand words of verbal content for 
can be found in Appendices A and B. 
 While some of the data, diverging farthest from zero on the dependent variable, appeared 
to be outliers, it was not necessarily true that this was the case. Looking at the aggregate battle 
deaths of each case in my dataset, a clear outlier was China, having resulted in over one million 
battle deaths. However, as analysis of raw residuals revealed, the Indonesia and Bosnia cases had 
residuals farthest from zero. These numbers were not so far removed from the rest of the cases 












Table 2: Count Model Results 
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27 26 27 26 29 29 27 27 
Log 
likelihood 
-250.88842 -237.86873 -245.95188 -243.52515 -270.38979 -263.78553 -264.43213 -262.18682 
*** Significant at 0.001 
** Significant at 0.01 






Models 1 - 4 
 Models 1 - 4 show the regression of the data against the operational code variable of I1 
and the leadership traits, self-confidence and either conceptual complexity or need for power, 
which has already been delineated above in Table 2. In Model 1, I1 shows statistical significance 
at the 0.05 level. It suggests that non-state battle deaths will decrease as a leader’s direction of 
strategy becomes increasingly cooperative, as predicted in Hypothesis 1. Duration is significant 
at the 0.001 level and moves in a direction that indicates an increase in lethality for longer wars. 
StateBattleDeaths is also a statistically significant variable at the 0.001 level with a direction that 
indicates an increase in non-state battle deaths as state battle deaths increase. P1 and DIS were 
excluded from this model because of their significant correlation with I1. PWR was excluded 
from the model because it was significantly correlated with conceptual complexity. 
PopulationDensity was excluded from the model because of its significant correlation with 
RegimeType.  
Model 2 analyzed much of the same variables as Model 1 but looked, instead, at the 
variables that were excluded from Model 1, because of their significant correlations, to see their 
effects on the psychological variables. In Model 2, I1 was analyzed with self-confidence and 
need for power; P1 and DIS were still excluded because of their significant correlation with I1 
and CC was excluded because of its significant correlation with PWR. RegimeType was left out 
in this model in order to run the psychological variables against PopulationDensity. In this 
model, I1 was again significant at the 0.05 level and indicates that as a leader’s direction of 
strategy becomes increasingly cooperative, non-state battle deaths decrease as predicted in 





increase as a leader’s need for power increases. This result suggests that I was correct in my 
prediction in Hypothesis 5. Duration is significant at the 0.001 level and moves in a direction that 
indicates an increase in lethality for longer wars. StateBattleDeaths is again significant at the 
0.001 level. 
Model 3 examines I1 with self-confidence and need for power but with the structural 
variable, RegimeType, instead of the structural variable, PopulationDensity. In this model, I1 is 
significant at the 0.05 level and accurately corroborates my hypothesis that more cooperative 
leaders will cause less non-state battle deaths, while PWR is significant at the 0.001 level and 
tells us that my prediction was correct in that leaders with a higher need for power will increase 
non-state battle deaths. Duration and StateBattleDeaths are both significant at the 0.001 level. 
Model 3 and Model 2 are similar in their results, both indicating statistical significance with I1 
and PWR. 
Model 4 measures I1 against self-confidence and conceptual complexity and with 
PopulationDensity instead of RegimeType. I1 is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and is 
the only statistically significant psychological variable in the model. It indicates that Hypothesis 
1 is again correct in predicting that leaders who have a more cooperative direction of strategy 
will decrease non-state battle deaths. Duration and StateBattleDeaths are both significant at the 





Models 5 - 6 
Models 5 and 6 measure the operational code variable of P1 against the leadership traits, 
self-confidence and either conceptual complexity or need for power, depending on the 
correlations between the variables as delineated above. The psychological variables of I1 and 
DIS were excluded from both models for their significant correlation with P1, as were the 
structural variables of RegimeType and ReligiousDifference for their correlation with P1. Model 
5 measures P1 against self-confidence and conceptual complexity. P1 is the only statistically 
significant psychological variable in this model and shows significance at the 0.001 level while 
moving in the hypothesized direction. The value and direction of P1 suggests that civil war 
lethality decreases as a leader’s view of the political universe becomes increasingly friendlier as 
predicted in Hypothesis 2. Duration and StateBattleDeaths are both significant at the 0.001 level, 
while NonInitiatingLeader is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The positive direction of 
the NonInitiatingLeader variable’s coefficient, however, indicates that we cannot accept 
Hypothesis 13. The results tell us that leaders who come to power after civil war onset have a 
greater impact on lethality than those leaders who are in power at the onset of civil war. 
Model 6 analyzes P1 against self-confidence and with need for power instead of 
conceptual complexity, as was the case in Model 5. RegimeType and ReligiousDifference are 
again excluded because of their significant correlation with P1. In this model, P1 is statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level indicating that leaders with a friendlier view of the political 
universe decrease non-state battle deaths in civil war. PWR is also statistically significant in this 





in civil wars. MilitaryExpenditure is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and moves in the 
hypothesized direction. The result tells us that non-state battle deaths increase in war’s where 
states allocate a large portion of their budget to the military. Because this variable measures the 
absolute amount of state money spent on the military, it is analyzed in relation to all of the cases. 
Duration and StateBattleDeaths are both statistically significant at the 0.001 level. 
NonInitiatingLeader is also statistically significant at the 0.001 level but moves counter to the 
hypothesized direction. The result in this model also tells us that those leaders who come to 
power during civil wars, as opposed to those leaders who are in power at their onset, have a 
greater impact on non-state battle deaths. 
Models 7 - 8 
 Models 7 and 8 analyze just the leadership traits without the operational code variables. 
This was done to look at the relationship that a leader’s level of distrust has on lethality since it 
was dropped in the other six cases as a result of it being significantly correlated with both I1 and 
P1. RegimeType and Duration are also dropped in both models as a result of their significant 
correlation with DIS. Model 7 analyzes DIS with self-confidence and conceptual complexity. In 
this model, DIS is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. This result indicates that leaders 
with high levels of distrust have a significant positive effect on lethality; as leader distrust 
increases, non-state battle deaths increase. StateBattleDeaths is significant at the 0.001 level 
while ReligiousDifference is significant at the 0.01 level. ReligiousDifference, though, moves in 





indicates that lethality increases during civil wars where the state leader shares the same religious 
beliefs as the majority of the populace. 
Model 8 analyzes DIS with self-confidence and need for power. DIS, again, has statistical 
significance at the 0.001 level, indicating that more distrustful leaders increase lethality in civil 
wars. PWR is significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that leaders with a high need for power 
increase lethality in civil wars. StateBattleDeaths has significance at the 0.001 level while 
ReligiousDifference, with a statistical significance at the 0.05 level, moves contrary to the 
hypothesized direction. This tells us that leaders who share the same religious beliefs as the 
majority of the populace increase lethality more than those leaders whose religious beliefs differ 
from the majority of the populace’s. 
The results are pretty clear in indicating how significant a role psychological variables 
play in determining the causes of lethality in civil war. We have seen that four particular 
psychological variables were statistically significant predictors of lethality: I1, P1, DIS, and 
PWR. Each of these four variables showed significance in every model in which they appeared 
and when controlled with several structural variables. 
To give better meaning to my results, I ran predicted values models for each statistically 
significant psychological variable. The tables will show the average number of non-state battle 
deaths per unit increase of each variable, which is indicated under the ‘value’ columns. As I1 and 
P1 are scaled on a spectrum of -1 to 1, the range is broken into increments of 0.5. The predicted 
values for I1 were analyzed against the variables in Model 3, where I1 performed as predicted 





were analyzed against the variables in Model 6, where P1 performed as predicted despite several 
well-performing structural variables. 
As the predicted values of I1 show in Table 3, Hypothesis 1 is correct in that leaders will 
increase non-state battle deaths as their direction of strategy becomes more conflictual. Leaders 
who have an extremely conflictual direction of strategy are responsible for an average of 251,450 
non-state battle deaths, while leaders who have an extremely cooperative direction of strategy are 
responsible for only an average of 29,822 non-state battle deaths. The largest increase in the 
absolute number of non-state battle deaths occurs when the direction of strategy for leaders 
decreases one unit, or 0.05 points, from -0.5 to -1 (extremely conflictual), resulting in an increase 
of 103,889 non-state battle deaths. 
Leaders with a strategic outlook (I1) that is more conflictual during civil wars will cause 
non-state battle deaths to increase, as the results show. This can be attributed to leaders viewing 
the “other” as incapable of negotiating or instigating diplomatic dialogue in order to cease 
hostilities. They view the insurgents as needing or wanting to fight, and no other option is 












Table 3: I1 - Predicted Values 
I1 value Mean Standard Deviation 
-1 251,450 1,103,955 
-0.5 147,561 647,847 
0 86,595 380,184 
0.5 50,818 223,108 
1 29,822 130,929 
 
Leaders who view the political universe as more hostile (P1) are more apt to increase 
non-state battle deaths. Interpreting the enemy’s intentions, for instance, as indication for hostile 
behavior, can result in preemptive action by the leader against the insurgents and the populace. 
Assuming hostile intent based on one’s view or understanding of the nature of the political 
universe can lead to an increase in non-state battle deaths that are either provoked or 
unprovoked. How the leader interprets the situation regardless of whether hostile action has been 
taken can be a causal effect of lethality. A leader’s psychology as it relates to operational code, 
or the leader’s conscious perception and reaction to the world and others, shows us that leaders 
exhibiting significance in these psychological variables can have a causal effect on the lethality 
of civil wars.  
As the predicted values show in Table 4, Hypothesis 2 is correct in that leaders will 
increase non-state battle deaths the more hostile their view of the nature of the political universe 
becomes. Leaders who have an extremely hostile view of the nature of the political universe are 





extremely friendly view of the nature of the political universe are responsible for an average of 
7,528 non-state battle deaths. The largest increase in the absolute number of non-state battle 
deaths occurs when the view of the nature of the political universe decreases by one unit, or 0.05 
points, from -0.5 to -1 (extremely hostile), resulting in an increase of 270,834 non-state battle 
deaths. 
 
Table 4: P1 - Predicted Values 
P1 value Mean Standard Deviation 
-1 426,211 1,653,023 
-0.5 155,377 602,615 
0 56,643 219,686 
0.5 20,649 80,087 
1 7,528 29,196 
 
DIS and PWR are leadership trait variables and scaled differently than the operational 
code variables. The leadership trait variables are scaled on a spectrum of 0 to 1. The values for 
DIS and PWR have thus been recoded to show unit increases of 0.2 and indicate the respective 
average number of non-state battle deaths. The predicted values for DIS were analyzed against 
the variables in Model 7, where DIS performed as predicted despite controls for several well-
performing structural variables. The predicted values for PWR were analyzed against the 
variables in Model 6, where PWR performed as predicted despite controls for several well-





Leaders who are more trusting and do not require a high need to gain or maintain power 
are also responsible for less non-state battle deaths than leaders who do have a high level of 
distrust and a high need for power. Models 7 and 8 showed this with regards to a leader’s level of 
distrust. A leader’s increasingly distrustful nature toward the world and other actors shows a 
causal effect on the lethality of civil wars. Leaders who lack trust in the motives of others, 
specifically in war, will likely have negative beliefs on how others will act in a situation. This 
would result in taking more egregious or preemptive actions against the enemy.  
As the predicted values show in Table 5, Hypothesis 3 is correct in that leaders will 
increase non-state battle deaths the more distrustful they become of others. Leaders who are 
more distrustful of others are responsible for an average of 81,000,000 non-state battle deaths, 
while leaders who are less distrustful of others are responsible for an average of 4,079 non-state 
battle deaths. The largest increase in the absolute number of non-state battle deaths occurs when 
a leader’s level of distrust increase by one unit, or 0.2 points, from 0.8 to 1, resulting in an 













Table 5: DIS - Predicted Values 
DIS value Mean Standard Deviation 
0 4,079 16,133 
0.2 29,521 116,763 
0.4 213,663 845,094 
0.6 1,546,422 6,116,524 
0.8 11,200,000 44,300,000 
1 81,000,000 320,000,000 
 
As PWR indicates, leaders who have an increased need for power are more likely to 
increase non-state battle deaths during periods of civil war. Leaders needing or wanting to 
solidify their hold on their power over the people and the country during times of war are more 
likely to exert force in order to maintain that power or to gain more of it. Power is an influential 
tool and can affect multiple facets of warfighting and the strategies and tactics used in civil war. 
Those leaders who are losing power will exert more of it through desperation in order to gain it 
back and prevent exile or death. Those leaders who have power and are unwilling to relinquish it 
will use everything at their disposal to discourage another from taking it. This variable was 
shown to be statistically significant in every model which suggests that leaders who need power 
are more willing to increase the number of non-state battle deaths in order to keep or maintain it. 
As the predicted values show in Table 6, Hypothesis 6 is correct in that leaders will 
increase non-state battle deaths as their need for power increases. Leaders who have a high need 





have a lower need for power are responsible for an average of 3,711 non-state battle deaths. The 
largest increase in the absolute number of non-state battle deaths occurs when a leader’s need for 
power increase by one unit, or 0.2 points, from 0.8 to 1, resulting in an increase of 2,741,268 
non-state battle deaths. 
 
Table 6: PWR - Predicted Values 
PWR value Mean Standard Deviation 
0 3,711 13,598 
0.2 14,735 53,996 
0.4 58,513 214,419 
0.6 232,355 851,454 
0.8 922,678 3,381,115 








 This thesis set out to predict and explain the extent to which a leader’s psychology 
affected the lethality of civil wars in the post-WWII world. Distinctly looking at what I termed 
the modern age of warfare, I sought not only to look at the structural determinants to this end but 
to expand on this research and delve into an area with little to no scholarly research attributed to 
it. My hopes are that the significant results will lead to scholars building on my research and 
providing an even more thorough analysis with better explanatory data as a result. Further, the 
availability of the requisite resources to accomplish the gathering of foreign sources of speech 
data precluded me from enjoying a larger sample size. Accessibility to this data will only add to 
any future study in this subject. 
When studying civil wars from the past and present, applying the human factor and 
effects of leadership during these wars, the results should aid in predicting the severity of future 
civil wars, thus influencing foreign policy and how future leaders handle these situations in order 
to prevent mass casualties and unjustified deaths. It is my hope that this thesis has done just that: 
provided the seminal, pioneering work that meshes psychological and structural determinants of 
lethality in this modern age of warfare to help prevent future violence and allow policy makers 
and warfighters a greater understanding of how to deal with future atrocities on a military and 
policy-making level. The results of this thesis will allow decision-makers to assess foreign 
leaders engaged in civil war should they be required to aid as a result of treaty obligations or 
national interest. Understanding leaders and their psychological dispositions toward violence and 





in determining which individuals should be supported during foreign elections or placed in 
power if a government falls who represents a specific set of ideals and political beliefs aligned 
with our national interests. 
Discussion of the Models 
 The theory I tested in this thesis stated that leader psychology plays a significant role in 
civil war lethality. To test this, I ran eight total models – four containing I1, two containing P1, 
and two containing just the leadership traits – with thirty cases, though some were omitted in the 
STATA modelling process due to missing data. The models returned some significant results 
pertaining to psychological determinants of lethality while also explaining a few structural 
variables.  
 This data reflects the premise of count data models as a more accurate method of 
measuring discrete data than linear regression. Linear regression assumes that the data of the 
dependent variable is continuous, whereas my data is discrete and does not consist of negative or 
partial integers. I privilege the use of count data models in this thesis because it is my belief, 
based on the supporting evidence used to justify my reasoning for doing so in this thesis, that 
analyzing my data with zero-truncated negative binomial regression best explains, and better 
quantitatively predicts, the effects of my independent variables on lethality.  
As indicated by the predicted values tables above for each of the four significant 
psychological variables, I1, P1, DIS, and PWR were all shown to be significant indicators of 





political universe become more cooperative and friendlier, respectively, lethality decreases. DIS 
and PWR both suggest that as these variables move in a positive direction, representing an 
increase in distrust and need for power, respectively, lethality increases.  
The psychological data were measured against seven structural variables, though not all 
at the same time due to the multicollinearity experienced between several of them. Five of the 
seven structural variables returned significant results. Surprisingly, RegimeType did not 
significantly predict lethality as I had expected. This might be explained by some of the literature 
relating to this occurrence: “When circumstances do not favor democracies, when they are in 
desperation of victory or less tolerant of costs, or they are challenged by a strong opponent, they 
are just as likely as non-democracies to incorporate increased levels of violence” (Downes, 2008; 
Engelhardt, 1992; Arreguín-Toft, 2003).  
Also, surprisingly, NonInitiatingLeader did not have the expected results. Leaders who 
come to power after civil war onset might be more likely to increase non-state battle deaths in 
order to solidify their roles as leader through a projection of strength, to garner respect through 
fear, or to end hostilities, realizing that the predecessor’s strategy failed to resolve the 
insurgency. Despite these variables not showing statistical of substantive significance, several 
other structural variables did. 
Duration showed high significance at the 0.001 level, in every model which it was 
present, indicating that as wars progress and prolong, non-state battle deaths increase. 
StateBattleDeaths was measured in every model, and in every model, it also showed high 
significance at the 0.001 level, indicating that as the state leader suffers more fatalities to his 





retaliatory response by the leader against the insurgents but also, too, against the civilians to 
project what future consequences might be should they allow the insurgents to launch another 
successful attack against the state. Coercion can help in deterring the populace from aiding the 
enemy or in giving information about the enemy and his movements or plans to the state.  
State leaders can have a heavy influence on the duration of civil war conflict. Leaders 
involved in intrastate conflict have the tools and personnel to sustain the fighting as well as other 
resources native to the country. They have the ability to control concessions and negotiations and 
are not reliant on another state’s capabilities or demands when making decisions. As long as the 
state leader is fighting an insurgency and has not lost control or power, it is in the leader’s best 
interest, if victory is not quick and decisive, to prolong the fighting as long as possible in order to 
force capitulation and maintain the status quo. 
MilitaryExpenditure was statistically significant in Model 6 where P1 and PWR were 
also significant. Leaders with a more hostile view of the political and an increased need for 
power are likely to allocate more budgetary funding toward the military in order to strengthen its 
capabilities and manpower. A stronger, larger military can be a capable tool used to suppress the 
opposition and the population and to quell any thought of or action toward insurrection by 
insurgents through the use of armed violence, martial law, or show of force. 
ReligiousDifference was significant in Models 7 and 8, when the operational code 
variables were omitted for the leadership trait variables in order to measure DIS. However, as 
stated above, this variable moved in a surprising direction. Though it was only statistically 
significant in Models 7 and 8, it moved in a direction contrary to Hypothesis 10 and was thus, 





religious minority would seek to attack those in the weaker majority leading to an increase in 
lethality, this was not shown to be the case. 
StateBattleDeaths accurately explained how a leader would react while engaging an 
enemy in a civil war when the state’s forces are attacked. If the state were to suffer fatalities as a 
result of an enemy attack, the state leader would be highly likely to respond with attacks 
resulting in higher numbers of non-state battle deaths. This was shown to be highly significant in 
all eight models. As Lyall (2009) stipulates, if it is believed by the state leader that the populace 
was involved either directly or indirectly, actively or passively, in the attack or in the 
preparations leading to the attack, then high levels of lethality are to be expected by the leader. 
These actions are a means of retribution and coercion against the populace in order to prevent 
them from aiding or supporting the insurgents in the future. 
Ultimately, as the psychological data reveals, leaders who are significant in I1, P1, DIS, 
and PWR are more likely to increase lethality in civil wars. The data from the models are pretty 
clear and show that psychological determinants do have a significant effect on lethality in civil 
war. This particular area of scholarly research, identifying how leaders may act in wars 
concerning matters of lethality, deserves future study as well as attention from policy makers 
concerning matters of warfighting. A leader’s psychology, as the models suggest, has a profound 
impact on the number of non-state battle deaths in civil war and should be considered as 





The Way Ahead: Future Research 
 This thesis has provided interesting results on the effects of leader psychology on 
civil war outcomes in terms of lethality measure in non-state battle deaths. But while this thesis 
sought to provide thought-provoking research and hopefully to establish a stronger foundation 
for this tract of scholarship, there is much room for improvement and future research. The 
analytical gain this evidence provides is such that it will aid to existing research and literature in 
better analyzing the causal effects of lethality in civil wars as they pertain to state leader 
psychology.  
 As stated earlier, one of the obstacles I faced was gathering large quantities of speech 
data for each leader in each case of my dataset. The reasons for not including much of this work, 
resulting in a minimization of cases, is not due solely to the unavailability of verbal content but 
rather the inability of the researcher to acquire the verbal content from foreign media sources, to 
transcribe the verbal content from foreign languages, or to obtain printed versions of the 
material, not accessible digitally. Should future researchers seek to expand on this study, further 
revelations on the causal effects of psychology and lethality may present themselves should the 
resources be available to them to acquire the necessary verbal content. 
 I wanted, also, to focus the parameters of this thesis solely on six psychological variables, 
four leadership traits and two operational code variables. Though there are still a multitude of 
other psychological variables that may be analyzed for future research with scholarly 
applications. The operational code indices of I2-I5 and P2-P5 (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003, 
218-232) as well as the three remaining leadership traits mentioned in Footnote 5 may provide 





lethality in civil wars as a reflection a leader’s conscious and subconscious psychology. The 
effects of the operational code indices of I2-I5 and P2-P5 should provide especially useful 
results. The instrumental beliefs, I2-I5 are related to the question posed by I1: what is the 
leader’s direction of strategy for political action. The philosophical beliefs, P2-P5, all help 
explain the leader’s view of his role in the political universe. Each of these variables will help in 
better explaining the results of I1 and P1by offering more in depth analysis of a leader’s 
conscious political beliefs as they relate to the world and others beyond what I have provided in 
this thesis. 
There are several ways to improve and expand upon this thesis and it is my hope that this 
research provided the necessary foundation for any future research to come regarding political 
leadership and the psychological determinants of lethality in modern warfare. Having the 
explanations for these disparities and gaps in research will, as described above, add to the current 
literature and aid in the understanding of the existing knowledge on this specific field of study as 
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Figure 1: Dispersion of aggregate battle deaths from cases not included in final dataset 
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